JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. circulation is found to be a substitute for both water intake and water discharge. This confirms that expanding the use of economic incentives (e.g., effluent fees) may be effective in encouraging firms to reduce their water use while increasing in-plant recirculation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that almost every commercial enterprise uses water as a productive input, the current body of knowledge regarding the economic characteristics of commercial and industrial water demand is quite limited. This stands in contrast to the efforts devoted in the recent past to model the use of labor, capital, and energy inputs by the manufacturing sector. This situation is also in marked contrast to the amount of attention paid in this and other journals to estimating the structure of residential water demands (Billings and Agathe 1980; Terza and Welsh 1982; Polzin 1984; Schefter and David 1985) . What makes this situation so significant is that industrial water use accounts for 30 percent to 40 percent of total recorded water use (Pearse, Bertrand, and MacLaren 1985; Gibbons 1986 ). If this sector's water intake and discharge are to be regulated efficiently, it is necessary to understand the role of water in its production process.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the structure of industrial water demand. This is done by estimating the derived demand for water using establishment-level data from a cross-sectional survey of water use by Canadian manufacturing firms. In order to fully characterize the structure of industrial water demands, it is assumed that industrial water use can be modeled as having four components: the quantity of water obtained from external sources, the degree of treatment undertaken for intake water, the extent of water recirculation practiced, and the final treating and discharging of waste water. Each of the four components is treated as a separate input and the four demands are estimated as a system of interrelated equations.
A particularly important issue in water demand estimation concerns the definition of the price variable. Most firms face water prices in the form of a declining block rate structure. If average cost or marginal price is used to proxy the price of water, then it is possible that a simultaneity bias will be introduced into the estimation. In contrast to other studies of industrial water demand, the approach adopted here is to represent the price of intake water with an instrumental variable estimated using data from municipal water utility price schedules.
Results of the estimation indicate that manufacturing firms are sensitive to the costs of their water use. Price elasticities for intake water range from -0.1534 (Plastics and Rubber) to -0.5885 (Pulp and Paper). Furthermore, it is found that intake and recirculation are substitutes for all industry groups.
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II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
There are only a handful of studies which examine the structure of industrial water demands econometrically.' The first generation of studies is represented by Rees (1969) , Turnovsky (1969) , and DeRooy (1974). These studies estimate single-equation water demand models where the proxy most frequently used for price is total expenditure divided by the total quantity purchased. These studies find that water demand is usually inelastic. For example, Turnovsky (1969) reports price elasticities ranging from -0.50 to -0.63. Subsequent studies have extended the analysis of industrial water use in several directions. Grebenstein and Field (1979) and Babin, Willis, and Allen (1982) estimate translog cost functions for the American manufacturing industry using state-level cross-sectional observations. Water is included as an input along with labor, capital, and materials, and the price of water is defined as its average cost. The average value for water's price elasticity ranges from 0.0 to -0.801, depending on the industry.
Williams and Suh (1986) estimate singleequation demand functions for municipally supplied firms. Each observation represents aggregate industrial water use in one municipality. The price elasticity's average value ranges from -0.437 to -0.974 and intake's demand elasticity with respect to value added ranges from 0.176 to 0.296.
All of these studies use the average cost of water acquisition to represent the price of water.2 This is significant for three reasons. First, it introduces a simultaneity bias into the estimation because the quantity of water appears on both sides of the regression equation (Judge et al. 1982 2Ziegler and Bell (1984) are something of an exception as they compare the predictive power of the estimated average and marginal cost of water intake. The authors consider the water intake decision for a small sample of self-supplied paper and chemical firms. Information on each firm's total cost of intake water allows the authors to compare the estimated marginal and average cost as proxies for the unknown price of water. The authors conclude that average cost is the better predictor of the consumption of intake water. The estimated price elasticity of intake demand when price is represented by average cost is -0.078 while the same price elasticity is positive when price is proxied by marginal cost. This research extends the concept of industrial water use beyond the demand for intake water by incorporating features of the firm's use of water inside its plant. Industrial water use can be characterized by four separate but interrelated activities undertaken by the firm: the quantity of water to be purchased initially, the degree of purification and treatment required, the amount of water to be recirculated, and the form and quantity of water to be discharged. The extent of each of these activities will depend on the costs of water use and the prices of other inputs.
It is frequently the case that the analyst has only observations on a subset of the firm's inputs. The data sets used in this research, for example, contain detailed information regarding water use but not on any other inputs. In this case, it is necessary to assume that the productive technology is separable in its inputs (Chambers 1988). In particular, a firm's technology is said to be weakly separable if the cost function can be rewritten in the following way: where the parameters ?p and vi are error terms. Economic theory requires that C,(-) exhibit homogeneity of degree one in prices and symmetry. These restrictions are imposed prior to estimation. The cost function C, and three of its four share equations are estimated using an iterative three-stage least squares procedure.3
The estimated cost function coefficients may be used to compute estimates of the own-and cross-price elasticities. When the cost function is approximated by a translog these elasticities may be expressed as the following: Publicly supplied firms receive water from a water utility and discharge it into a sewer system. Self-supplied firms withdraw water directly from the natural bodies of water (streams, lakes, or groundwater) and discharge their waste waters into them. In the case of self-supplied firms, costs of water intake include pumping costs and payments of provincial royalties.4
The Survey of Municipal Water Prices provides the following data for each Canadian municipal water utility serving a population of at least 5,000 in 1985: the structure of residential, commercial, and industrial price schedules (including the level of marginal prices and the number and size of the price blocks), connection fees, and sewer charges.
These data are used to construct the variables necessary to estimate the structure of [4] and its associated demands. With respect to the price of water intake, use is made of the information contained in the water utility price schedules. While the sur3Initial results indicated that the error terms were heteroskedastic and, thus, the system was reestimated with White's (1980) correction for heteroskedastic errors.
4In Canada, three provinces (British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia) currently charge a royalty for the direct withdrawal of water from the natural environment. Self-supplied firms reporting no intake expenditures were deleted from the data set.
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November 1992 vey of municipal water prices contains information regarding marginal water prices, these data are not directly used in the estimation procedure. The reason for this is that the water consumption observations are annual and the water price schedules are based on weekly, monthly, or bimonthly consumption levels. Without knowing the distribution of industrial water use within the year it is impossible to determine the marginal price of intake water. As an alternative, the approach adopted here is to proxy the price of water intake by an instrumental variable whose construction follows Jones and Morris (1984) . This is done by regressing the observed average cost of intake water against the features of the price schedule facing the firm (the average of the marginal price blocks, the number of blocks, the difference between the first and last blocks, and the annual connection fee). This procedure allows the researcher to avoid defining the price of water as the ex post observed average cost.5
The above procedure could not be used to construct prices for treatment, recirculation or discharge as there are no external market prices for these quantities. Instead the marginal cost of each activity is estimated by regressing its total cost against its total quantity and the square of total quantity. The estimated coefficients from this quadratic regression are then used to compute the estimated marginal cost of the activity at the observed quantity level. Finally, the level of output is measured by the dollar value of output.
Summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation are presented in Table 1. 5Terza (1986) argues that the Instrumental Variable approach, such as that suggested by Jones and Morris, may artificially linearize the price schedule and, thus, produce a spurious negative correlation between quantity and price. I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this reference to my attention.
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IV. RESULTS
The estimated own-and cross-price elasticities are reported in Table 2 for the entire manufacturing industry and for each industry subgroup.6 All elasticities are computed by substituting the estimated coefficients and the average values of the actual cost shares into equation [7] .7 The elasticities are reported for each industry group as an upper triangular matrix, with diagonal elements being the own-price elasticities and the off-diagonal elements being the crossprice elasticities.
The results provide several interesting insights into the structure of water use by Canadian manufacturing firms. With respect to the own-price elasticities, all of the estimates are negative. The estimated elasticities are statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) for the following industries: Rubber, Textiles, Paper, and Minerals. Values for the price elasticity of water intake range from -0.1534 (Plastics and Rubber) to -0.5885 (Pulp and Paper). Also, within the class of own-price elasticities, the estimated values for Intake are consistently smaller (in absolute value) than those for the other three facets of water use.
It can be seen from the off-diagonal elements that in most instances the alternative facets of water use are substitutes for one another. In particular, the positive estimate for the Intake-Recirculation elasticity indicates that they are substitutes. This is a significant finding because it suggests that, if real prices for intake water were to rise, Canadian manufacturing firms would employ more water recirculation as a means of meeting their water needs. The off-diagonal elements also indicate that Recirculation and Discharge are substitutes. This result points to the potential for using economic incentives to reduce industrial pollution. If effluent taxes were imposed on Canadian manufacturing firms, then these firms could be expected not only to reduce the quantity of their water discharged but also to increase the amount of in-plant water recirculation. Finally, almost all of the estimated Intake-Treatment cross-price elasticities are statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level. This may be because there are both publicly and self-supplied firms in the data set. In the case of the former, some of the costs of water treatment will be contained in the price of intake water as the water utility does the bulk of water treatment for publicly supplied firms. In this case, it may be difficult to estimate accurately the demand for Treatment and its price elasticities.
Another way to consider the elasticity estimates in Table 2 is to compare them across industry groups. The industries with the largest elasticity values (in absolute value) are Paper and Wood Products, Chemicals and Petroleum, and Food and Beverage. These industries also have some of the largest ratios of water intake and water-related expenditures to value of output, as reported in Table 3 . Furthermore, Textiles and Plastics and Rubber are at the bottom of the ranking of ratios in Table 3 and also have smaller than average price elasticities for intake water. This correspondence between expenditures on water and the price elasticity of intake demand suggests that firms that have experienced relatively high water expenditures are also those firms that are predicted to be the most sensitive to changes in water prices. One possible interpretation of this finding is that low industrial water prices may not only encourage firms to consume excessively but they may also discourage these firms from adopting water-conserving technologies or undertaking research and development into water conservation (Tate and Rivers 1990). Thus, the most significant implication of underpricing water for industrial use may not be that it encourages excess consumption in the short run but that it allows these water use practices to become 6The estimated cost equation coefficients are, in themselves, not very informative. As a result, they are not reported here but they are available from the author.
7The actual shares are used rather than the fitted shares because Anderson and Thursby (1986) have demonstrated that the estimated elasticities are distributed asymptotically normal only when actual shares are used.
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November 1992 Notes: The ratio (QIN/VAL) compares the total quantity of intake water to the value of output. The ratio (TCW/VAL) compares the total cost of water use to the value of output. Note that if an industry's production technology is characterized by constant returns to scale then this ratio is approximately equal to water's share in total costs. Canadian manufacturing industry. It models industrial water use as having four separate but interrelated components: intake, treatment prior to use, recirculation, and discharge. The demand for each is derived from a water-use cost function and the set of demands is estimated as a system of equations. The price of intake water is represented by an instrumental variable because of the possibility of introducing a simultaneity bias into the estimation when average cost is used instead.
The estimation results indicate that industrial water use is sensitive to economic factors. The calculated own-price elasticities are negative for almost all of the industry groups and the cross-price elasticity between intake and recirculation shows them to be substitutes. These results provide the first econometric support for the prediction that raising the cost of water intake or discharge will lead manufacturing firms to increase their use of in-plant water recirculation.
